This paper is based on the idea that for each partner in a marriage, there are two distinct types of leisure. One type is each person's independent (or private) leisure, and the other type is spousal leisure, whose importance has long been emphasized in the literature of psychology. While each type of leisure is unobservable (only total leisure is observed), it is shown that the recent collective models of the intrahousehold allocation initiated by Chiappori can be extended to identify each type of leisure up to an additive constant. In particular, the effects of each member's wage, household unearned income, and extrahousehold environmental parameters on the independent and spousal leisure and on the sharing rule are fully identified. The observational requirement here is the same as in other studies, namely, the observation of individual labor supply, individual wages, household unearned income, one assignable good, and consumption expenditure at the household level.
I. Introduction
Economists rarely address the fact that for each partner in a marriage there are two distinct types of leisure.
1 One type is each partner's in-dependent (or private) leisure, and the other type is spousal leisure. The former is the leisure time one spends alone or with persons other than the spouse, and the latter refers to the leisure time that spouses spend together. Concerning intrahousehold resource allocation, distinguishing the two types of leisure is important conceptually and analytically. For example, if the husband goes out for drinks with his colleagues and the wife goes to the cinema with her friends, the conversation of the husband with his friends would not affect the utility of the wife directly and the movie does not directly make the husband happy. On the contrary, if they go out to dinner together (or conduct similar activities), they both directly enjoy this shared activity simultaneously. In other words, such leisure is a public good for the couple. Spousal leisure has long been a concern of psychologists. It is well documented that the stability of marriage is closely associated with time spouses spend together. For example, Dindia and Baxter (1987) report that spending time together was the second most frequently used maintenance strategy among 12 factors. This strategy was also highly ranked third among 50 in another study by Baxter and Dindia (1990) . The earlier study of Berger and Kellner (1964) also suggests that spousal conversation (which requires time together) is important for maintenance of a good marriage. Significant correlation between marital satisfaction/happiness and different measures of time that spouses spent together was found in various other studies (Burr 1973; Lewis and Spanier 1979; Snyder 1979) . The strong association suggests that time a couple spends together can serve as a good indicator of the stability of a marriage and deserves more attention from researchers. Can economists make some contribution to this issue?
While the idea of modeling household behavior as a collective process can be dated back at least to Becker's (1981) seminal work, Chiappori (1988) was the first to introduce a rigorous collective model of household labor supply based on Pareto efficiency alone. Treating leisure as a purely private good, Chiappori (1992) shows that from individual labor supply functions, the income sharing rule within the household can be recovered up to an additive constant. Browning et al. (1994) enrich Chiappori's pioneering work by introducing public goods into the model. Assuming separability between private goods and public goods and the existence of one good that can be observed at the individual level, they show that the sharing of total private commodity expenditure is identifiable up to a constant in a framework of fixed labor supply.
In this paper, we attempt to address two important related questions.
and fertility, it is somewhat surprising that economists have ignored the issue of different types of leisure in a marriage. The lack of economic research on this issue may reflect that there was no suitable framework for analysis in the past. The focus of the present paper is to show that recent collective models can be extended to analyze the issue.
First, given the importance of independent and spousal leisure, it is valuable to know how an exogenous change affects each type of leisure. For example, if a government considers an economic policy to increase spousal leisure, which may in turn increase marriage stability, then it is important to know the effect of the policy on independent and spousal leisure. Is it possible to econometrically identify (i.e., estimate) such effects for each type of leisure? This issue seems impossible to address because each type of leisure is unobservable at the individual or household level (the econometrician knows only the labor supply of each member). Thus the real question is whether it is possible to deduce (or recover) the effects discussed above from such observables as labor supply. Second, for the purpose of identification and other related issues, is it possible to maintain Chiappori's free leisure choice and at the same time take care of the existence of public goods as in Browning et al.? We shall provide a positive answer to both questions. In particular, we extend the existing literature by allowing leisure consumed by each member to be partly private and partly public in nature and allow each to be a choice variable of household members. Interestingly enough, we find that although independent leisure and spousal leisure are unobservable, their partial derivatives are fully recovered. Moreover, we show that the framework allows us to understand a lot about intrahousehold resource allocation, including the identification of private commodity expenditure and a sharing rule.
II. The Model
Consider a two-member household consisting of a husband and a wife. Besides private (i p 1, 2). goods, they also consume a vector of public goods, Q priced at P. With the fixed time endowment, T, each member supplies part as labor i l and consumes the rest as leisure. By supplying labor, member i earns wages at the rate w i . In addition, the family has nonlabor income, y. The main feature that differentiates our model from the existing literature is the introduction of spousal leisure. In every family, members contribute amount L Q of time for shared activities and reserve the rest of the leisure time, L i for independent activities. The
, independent leisure here is naturally treated as a private good. However, spousal leisure is considered a public good.
As in Chiappori (1992) , is treated as unobservable, and we can i C observe the aggregate consumption only at the household level C (p journal of political economy
observed because observed labor supply tells us only the sum of private and public leisure, not its composition. Browning et al. (1994) assume the existence of an assignable commodity, which is a commodity whose consumption can be observed at individual levels. The example that they suggest is clothing. In other words, although most consumption goods are observed only at the household level, there exist some that can be observed at the individual level.
In parallel to the existing literature, we assume that (i) household consumption decisions are Pareto efficient, (ii) members possess caring preferences in the sense that each member cares about the other's consumption only insofar as it gives the other member some individualistic utility, (iii) private goods and public goods are separable in each member's subutility function, and (iv) there exists one assignable good. These standard assumptions (separately or together) can be found in related works including Chiappori (1988 Chiappori ( , 1992 , Browning et al. (1994) , and Bourguignon, Browning, and Chiappori (1995) , among others. Given the caring assumption, each member's utility has the form
where and denote, respectively, member i's utility and subutility.
i i U V Under the separability assumption, members' subutility functions are represented by
In addition, under Pareto efficiency, household behavior can be expressed as the solution to the following program:
Note that, in general, is a function of w 1 , w 2 , and y. u It will be shown (in proposition 1) that the maximization of this problem can be decentralized through a two-stage decision-making process. In the first stage, the household decides on the expenditure on public goods, P Q, and the amount of public leisure, L Q . At the same time, nonlabor income, net of the expenditure on public goods, is divided between the two members according to a sharing rule such that
where J 1 and J 2 are the amounts received by members 1 and 2, respectively.
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In the second stage, on the basis of the share J i obtained and the obligation to contribute L Q amount of time with the spouse, each member maximizes his or her own subutility according to
Here, J i as defined is analogous to Chiappori's (1992) sharing rule. To see that, if we assume away public goods, then (1) will reduce to If we further get rid of spousal leisure, the budget con-
straint of (N) will also reduce to (with ),
and the whole setting will be identical to that of Chiappori (1992) . Browning et al. (1994) show the existence of a sharing rule in the presence of public goods with fixed labor supply. Here we modify it to capture the presence of spousal leisure and endogenous labor supply. Let y), problem (M) and and denote the solution to (N).
We make the following proposition. Pareto-efficient outcome can be reached through the two-stage decision process. Essentially, proposition 1 means that
i 1 2 and 3 Note that one of J i may be negative. For example, the high-wage spouse may share labor income with the other if y is low and wages are very different. 4 Because of space constraints, proofs are not provided here. The reader is referred to Fong and Zhang (1998) 
For convenience of exposition for the rest of the paper, we let i c p k and where k refers to a specific commodity. It follows
Equations (2a)- (2b) and (3) imply that the partner's wage rate and the household unearned income affect individuals' private commodity and leisure consumption only by changing the individual's budget for private consumption, X i . The reason is that the partner's wage rate w j and the household unearned income y play no role in (N), so they do not directly affect private consumption. It is shown below that this fact applies to individual expenditure on any group of private goods. Let
denote the reduced-form function of member i's expenditure on an arbitrary group of private goods (commodities or leisure or both). We can always express as
where n denotes the total number of private commodities and the ( )th private good is private (or independent) leisure. The coefn ϩ 1 ficient e k takes the value one if covers the kth good i (k p 1, … , n ϩ 1) E and zero otherwise. In order to facilitate the identification of intrahousehold resource allocation, which will be discussed in the next section, it is useful to state the following result. Proposition 2. Under assumptions i-iii, the effects of w j and y on member i's expenditure on any group of private goods occur (j ( i) purely through
In other words, can be equivalently
and this further implies that
i i ѨE /Ѩy ѨX /Ѩy Equation (5) is readily obtained by plugging (2b) and (3) into (4) and then defining the rewritten expenditure function as After i î E (X , w ).
i differentiating (5) with respect to w j and y and manipulating the derivatives, we can obtain (6). While is not observed, equation (6) shows that the ratio relating i X to can be deduced from a ratio relating to private expenditure on i X any commodity for individual i. This greatly reduces the observational requirement on data. As we shall soon see, equation (6) is a fundamental result that will be used to identify several variables of interest. These variables include each member's pattern of commodity expenditure, each member's independent and spousal leisure, and the sharing rule. These identifications will be carried out in the next section. For the rest of the paper, we define the ratios in (6) as A
i i ѨE /Ѩy ѨX /Ѩy
III. Identification of Intrahousehold Allocation
In this section we use property (7) derived in the previous section to identify how resources are allocated between a couple. First, we show that the introduction of spousal leisure into the model does not affect the identifiability of private commodity consumption. More interesting, we show that spousal leisure and independent leisure are also identifiable. Afterward, we recover the sharing rule J i (7) of the unearned income in the current extended framework. Since the household unearned income and the spouse's wage affect a member's private consumption only through the member's total private expenditure, it i X , is interesting to study how the total private expenditure affects an individual's pattern of consumption. We identify this effect later in the section. Let be the household-level consumption of the assignable c (w , w , y) where n and e k are as defined earlier.
Here we are interested in knowing whether e i is recoverable from the observation of household-level e. In the previous section, it was shown that the cross-wage or the household income effect on a member's expenditure on any group of private goods occurs through the member's expenditure share for private consumption. On the basis of this, we develop the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Under assumptions i-iv, the Engel curve of a member's expenditure on any group of private commodities is identified up to an additive constant if the expenditure on that group of private commodities is observed at the household level. In particular, the household income, cross-wage, and own-wage effects are, respectively,
Ѩw i where and a var-
iable with a subscript stands for the first derivative of the variable with respect to the subscripted variable. It is obvious that proposition 3 holds for the special case for e p 1 k that is, In other words, the identification of ini i k p 1, … , n, e p C . dividual aggregate private commodity consumption is an immediate implication of proposition 3. When proposition 3 is applied in the case for a particular k and for all the individual con-
sumption on any single nonassignable commodity is readily identified up to a constant as well. However, it is equally important to recognize that proposition 3 cannot be directly applied to identify independent leisure, because independent leisure is not observed even at the household level.
B. Identification of Independent and Spousal Leisure
We turn now to the central part of the paper: the identification of unobserved independent and spousal leisure. Although independent leisure is not observed at either household or individual levels, the concurrent nature of spousal leisure allows us to observe the difference between the independent leisure of both members. The idea is clear if we look at the equalities
In other words, the observable difference in labor supply turns out to be equivalent to the (negative) difference between unobservable independent leisure. Given the observation of the difference in independent leisure, we can show that independent leisure and spousal leisure are all recovered up to an additive constant. 5 This finding is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Under assumptions i-iv, the unobservable independent leisure and spousal leisure are identified up to an additive constant. In particular, the partials of the independent leisure are, respectively,
and the partials of the spousal leisure are
Ѩw i where and
y Propositions 3 and 4 tell us that not only does the introduction of spousal leisure not prevent us from identifying private commodity consumption of individuals, but independent leisure of each member and thus spousal leisure are also identifiable. Our next issue is to identify the sharing rule.
C. Identification of the Sharing Rule
In the current setting, the identification of the sharing rule is summarized by the following proposition. Proposition 5. Under assumptions i-iv, the partials of each member's unearned income share are identified, respectively, as
where C is the private commodity expenditure at the household level, and So far we have shown that, among other results, spousal leisure and the sharing rule can be identified. Given the budget constraint
the identification of L Q and J i implies the identification of In other i X . words, the first-stage resource allocation is fully characterized. The important question is then whether we can identify the effects of on i X private commodities and leisure in the second-stage allocation. This question is important also because, as discussed before, it is only through that w j and nonlabor income affect member i's individual consumpi X tion. The following result provides a positive answer. Proposition 6. Under assumptions i-iv, the marginal effects of each member's total budget for private consumption on his or her expenditure on any group of private commodities and independent leisure are identified as follows: 
D. Identification with Only First Derivatives
In the previous subsections, on the basis of the minimum observational requirement, we allow in the sharing rule three "standard" sharing factors: the two members' wage rates and the household unearned income.
From propositions 3-6, we can see that the partials of the sharing rule, individual consumption on unassignable commodities, independent leisure, and spousal leisure are fully recovered as terms of the first and second derivatives of some functions. This means that identification depends on the nonlinearity of the functions. However, in addition to the three sharing factors, in some surveys, we are also able to obtain data such as unearned income at individual levels or some "extrahousehold environmental parameters," which impose no direct effect on demands. In this subsection, we show that if we observe one such additional sharing factor, we can develop an alternative way of identification that does not depend on the nonlinearity of functions. This is important since identification that is not based on nonlinearity is generally more robust (Bourguignon et al. 1995) . The following proposition summarizes the results. Proposition 7. Under assumptions i-iv, if there exists one more sharing factor other than individual wages and household unearned income, then the partials of individual consumption on unassignable commodities, independent and spousal leisure, and the sharing rule are all fully identified in terms of the first derivatives of some observable functions.
IV. Conclusions
This paper has explored the fact that spouses spend some leisure time together and some leisure time separately. Despite the unobservability of each type of leisure, it is shown that each type of leisure can be identified up to an additive constant, under standard assumptions in the literature. This surprising result is obtained by extending the recent collective models to allow both public goods and endogenous labor supply. Such a result is simply impossible in "neoclassical" household models. It thus illustrates the power of the individualistic collective setting. Furthermore, we show that the framework allows us to understand a great deal about intrahousehold resource allocation. These results are useful for governments that consider policies targeting spousal leisure and gender-specific consumption, which may increase marriage stability or reduce gender inequality within the household.
